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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
one, the assignee has a preference over the assignor; 12 and (2) There
is no contribution between purchasers in succession at different times
of different parts of the estate of a judgment debtor.' 3 Again it is said
that it is inequitable to allow a mortgagee-assignor who has assigned
a part of the notes or bonds secured by the mortgage and has received
the consideration therefor to compete with the assignee in the insufficient mortgage security. 14 If the assignee knows of the existence of
the mortgage, he knows that there are other notes that may be assigned by the mortgagee, and if as between the assignees the pro rata
rule applies he takes subject to this rule (risk), that is, he pays for
the note or bond assigned -to him on this basis. If he does not know of
the mortgage security, he has not relied upon it in making his purchase.
So there seems to be no equitable basis on which to allow him priority
over the mortgagee-assignor. Again, to allow the assignee priority over
the mortgagee-assignor would, in effect, give the latter a power of increasing the value of the mortgage security in those jurisdictions that
apply the pro rata rule as between the assignees and apply the pro
tanto rule as between the mortgagee-assignor and assignee, for, by assigning all of the notes or bonds, the mortgagee-assignor could give to
these last assigned a value which they did not theretofore have.1 5
Frank Lanigan.

RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE IN GENERAL.-In the case of Daddario v.
Town of Milford, 5 N. E. (2d) 23 (Mass. 1936), the plaintiff brought a suit in
equity to compel the return of a certified check for $5,000 which had been deposited by him with the defendant to accompany a bid or proposal for constructing a sewerage treatment works in the town of Milford, Massachusetts. The
contract was to be awarded under the rules and regulations of the Public Works
Administration as published in a pamphlet furnished to the bidders. The advertisement for the bids provided that no award could be made by the sewer commissioners without the authorization of the State director of the Public Works
Administration, and that no bidder might withdraw his bid for a period of thirty
days after the date set for the opening of the bids. The advertisement also provided that a certified check for $5,000, payable to the defendant as security for
the execution of the contract, should accompany the proposal and that the bidder
to whom the contract was awarded had ten days from the date of the notice of
the award to execute his contract and bond, otherwise the $5,000 would be forfeited as liquidated damages. On October 28, 1935, the plaintiff signed this proposal as his bid, and the bids were opened on October 29, 1935. On October 30,
1935, the plaintiff wrote the following letter: "Will you kindly allow me to
Van Rensselear v. Stafford, 1 Hopk. Ch. 569 (1825).
Clowes v. Dickenson, 5 John. Ch. 235 (1821).
14 PONMRORy, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE (4th ed.) 1203.
15 See Domeyer v. O'Connell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 835.
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withdraw my bid on your disposal plant as I made two serious errors in the
concrete. My price on 1-2-4 concrete was to be $26.50 a yard instead of $16.50
per yard and on the 1-2Y2 was to be $20 instead of $10 a yard. If you will
kindly allow me to withdraw my bid and return my check I will appreciate it
very kindly." The sewer commissioners, after receiving this letter on the same
date, held a special meeting and allotted the contract to the John MacDonald
Construction Company and sent a copy of their vote to the Public Works Administration authorities. The authorities informed them that they were to either
credit the $5,000 to the construction account or award the contract to the plaintiff as the lowest bidder. The plaintiff received word from the commissioners that
the contract had been awarded to him and that in case of his failure to execute
the contract and bond within ten days his $5,000 would be forfeited as liquidated
damages. He received the notice on December 3, 1935, and did not execute
the contract. nor bond within the ten days, but did file his bill of complaint on
December 11, 1935. The lower court dismissed the complaint and the -decision
was affirmed upon appeal and the final decree against the plaintiff was entered.
The opinion of the appellate court, as written by Justice Pierce, shows that the
decision was arrived at upon several grounds. First, "Disregarding the stipulation
as to time, the effect of the offer is that the offeree's power of acceptance continues until actual acceptance, that is, continues until terminated by actual acceptance or rejection of the offer or by any other means regarded as effective by the
law. 'Am. Law Inst. Restatement, Contracts, Section 34.'" Second, "The plaintiff's
letter of October 30, 1939, couched in terms of courtesy, can be construed as a
withdrawal of his offer, but the contract is clear that the plaintiff and -the defendant understood that the certified check delivered to the defendant was to be
forfeited as liquidated damages if the plaintiff within thirty days after the opening of the bids withdrew his offer contained in the proposal." The court thereupon
cites Turner v. City of Fremont, 170 Fed. 259 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909), Wheaton
Building & Lumber Company v. Boston, 204 Mass. 218, 90 N. E. 598 (1910), and
John J. Bowes Company v. Inhabitants of the Town of Milton, 255 Mass. 258,
151 N. E. 116 (1926), in support of its contentions. Third, that the plaintiff had
the right to withdraw his bid at the end of the thirty-day period and he did not
do so. Fourth, that there was not a mutual mistake of the plaintiff and the defendant as to any essential matter connected with the contract, and that it did not
appear that the mistake of the defendant was any more than a hasty statement of
the prices intended to be bid as distinguished from a mistake of material fact.
In considering the grounds as given for the decision in the order in which
they are set forth herein it should be noted that: First, as stated in the opinion
of the court, Section 34 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts states that
the effect of the offer is that the offeree's power of acceptance continues until acceptance or rejection of the offer or until terminated by any other means regarded
as effective by the law; but was there an offer in this case? Section 71 of the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts states that "If either party knows that the
other does not intend what his words or other acts express, this knowledge prevents such words or other acts from being operative as an offer or an acceptance."
According to the facts of the principal case, the defendant was informed by the
plaintiff that the bid did not express that which the plaintiff intended. This information was given to the defendant more than a month before acceptance was
attempted by the defendant. "One is not permitted to accept a promise which he
knows that the other party understands in a different sense than that in which
he understands it. In such a case there is no agreement." CONThACTS, 13 C. J.
§ 258, citing Mercer v. Hickman-Ebbert Company, 105 S.W. 441 (Ky. 1907).
Secondly, assuming that the plaintiff and the defendant both understood that
the certified check accompanying the offer was to be considered as forfeited as
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liquidated damages if the plaintiff within thirty days after the opening of the bids
withdrew his offer contained in the proposal, was there a withdrawal of the bid
by the plaintiff by his letter of October 30, 1935, or was the letter, in effect, a
notification to the defendant that the plaintiff had made a mistake in preparing his
bid thereby preventing the bid from becoming operative as an offer? The Massachusetts Court, in principal case, cites the case of Turner v. City of Fremont,
supra, wherein it was held that after the plaintiff had been declared the lowest
bidder on the proposed paving work and his bid was accepted by the city, his refusal to enter into a contract operated as a forfeiture of the deposit he had been
required to make, and the rights were thereby fixed and were not affected by
the subsequent action of the city council in declaring another the lowest -bidder and
accepting his bid. The court in that case also decided that the agreement between
the city and the bidder that a deposit of 5 % of the amount of his bid should be
considered as liquidated damages and forfeited to the city if the bidder's proposal
was accepted and he failed to enter into the contract was a valid and enforceable
agreement. The second case cited by the Massachusetts Court, Wheaton Building
& Lumber Company v. Boston, supra, is in accord with the holding that an
agreement fixing a definite sum as liquidated damages in case of a failure of the
bidder to enter into a contract, is valid and enforceable. In neither of these cases
is the factual situation one of withdrawal of a bid before acceptance, nor does a
mistake made by the bidder and known to the other party before acceptance
appear. In the case of the Northwestern Construction Company V. Town of North
Hempstead, 105 N. Y. S. 581 (1907), the defendant advertised for bids on the
'erection of a bridge according to certain plans. The plaintiff submitted his bid and
along with it the required certified check. On receipt of the bids, the commissioners,
in a joint session, adopted a resolution that the .secretary notify the plaintiff that
his bid for the construction of the bridge be accepted, conditioned upon leave
being granted by the board of supervisors to issue bonds of the town in the sum
of $20,000. Before any steps had been taken to notify the plaintiff of the acceptance of his bid, the plaintiff notified the commission by telegram not to
consider his bid and sent them a letter in which he claimed to have made a mistake in the bid and withdrawing it. The court decided that there was no acceptance of the plaintiff's bid which would bind him, and he was entitled to a return
of the deposit made by him when he submitted the bid. In Board of School Com'rs
v. Bender, 36 Ind. App. 164, 72 N. E. 154 (1904), the court held that the acceptance
of a bid several thousand dollars lower than intended by the bidder, in consequence
of his having turned two leaves of his estimate book and omitted estimate on part
of the work, did not create a contract, as the minds of the parties had not met;
and a complaint setting forth such facts and that prorhpt notice of the mistake
was given to the board accepting the bid, and the letting of the contract to the
next highest bidder, stated a cause of action in equity to rescind the bid and to
recover the deposit made as a guaranty that the bidder would enter into a contract if the bid was accepted.
In its final statement the Massachusetts Court correctly states that there was
no mutual mistake of the parties, but it goes on to state that it does not appear
that the mistake of the plaintiff was any more than a hasty statement of the
prices intended to be bid as distinguished from a mistake of material fact. The
Massachusetts Court cites the case of John J. Bowes Company v. Milton, supra,
to show that a mistake of one of the parties to a contract is not ground for
relief in either law or equity. There are many cases adopting the view that a
mistake in the terms of a bid, relating to price, is a material mistake of fact.
Northwestern Construction Company v. Town of North Hempstead, supra;
Board of School Com'rs v. Bender, supra; Mercer v. Hickman-Ebbert Company,
supra. And it appears in the facts of the principal case that there was not merely
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a mistake by one of the parties but that there was a mistake by one of the parties
and this mistake was known to the other party before acceptance was attempted,
thereby bringing the case under the rule stated in Section 71 of Restatement of
the Law of Contracts.
The opinion of the Massachusetts Court in the principal case does not appear
to the writer to be one of sound application of law to facts; and upon viewing
the decisions in point in other states, it does not seem that the Massachusetts
Court has much, if any, support in the decision it made in the case.
Edward J. Hummer.

CORPORATIONS--INsoLvENCY

AND RECEvERs-APPOINTMm=T

OF A RcECvER--

GRouNDs-DIssEusoN AS To MANAGEENT.-A bill was brought by certain stockholders, officers, and creditors of the defendant corporation in which they prayed
for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of all the assets on the ground
that the stock of the corporation was owned in equal shares by two contending
parties and that their condition threatened to result in the destruction of the
business and property of the corporation. Held, that under such circumstances a
court of equity may appoint a receiver to preserve the property of the corporation, administer it, and, if necessary, dispose of it for the protection of the creditors and the benefit of the owners. Saltz v. Saltz Bros., 84 Fed. (2d) 246 (App.
D. C. 1936).
The appointment of a receiver to take possession of the assets of a corporation
and distribute them is tantamount to dissolving the corporation by a decree in
equity. See People v. Shurtleff, 187 N. E. 271, 276 (Ill. 1933).
As a general rule a court of equity has no jurisdiction, in the absence of
statutory authority, to dissolve a corporation, and distribute its assets, at the
suit of a stockholder or any other private individual. CLARx, PRIVATE CoPoRArXoNs
(1916) 310. "Courts are particularly disinclined to appoint a receiver for misconduct or mismanagement of a corporation, or for the purpose of merely preserving its assets, where the application is made by stockholders, for the reason
that the sovereign does not furnish public agencies for the carrying on of private
enterprises." Blanchard Bra. & Lane v. S. G. Gay Co., 124 N. E. 616, 619 (Ill.
1919). While courts of chancery have no general power to appoint receivers of
corporations, dissensions among the stockholders or the members of the board of
directors may lead to the appointment of a receiver of a private corporation.
HARDY's S IrH oN REcEvERS (1920) 720. "Such a situation can exist usually
only when there is an equal or nearly equal division of the stock between the
contending parties. . . ." HARDY's S TrH ON REcEivERs (1920) 720. Where the
dissensions among those in charge of the corporation are of such a serious character
that it is impossible for the corporation to attain its objects for which it was
formed, or where the dissensions result in a deadlock in the management of the
business, a court of equity is considered as having power to appoint a receiver
to straighten out the muddle and even to wind up the affairs of the corporation.
Flemming v. Heffner & Flemming, 248 N. W. 900 (Mich. 1933); Sternberg v.
Wolff, 56 N. J. Eq. 389, 39 At. 397, 39 L. R. A. 762, 67 Am. Rep. 494 (1897);

Merrifield v. Burrows, 153 Ill. App. 523 (1910). On the other hand, some courts
have refused to appoint a receiver, where there is a deadlock in the management of the corporation, unless the complainants are able to show some fraud
or other wrong doing on the part of their opponents. HARDY's Smrrn oN Rz-

